Primitive Ontology and Laws of Nature by Allori, Valia
PRIMITIVE ONTOLOGY AND LAWS OF NATURE 
Valia Allori - Northern Illinois University 
“Bridging Metaphysics and Philosophy of Physics” Workshop  




In this talk I would like to present and hopefully discuss a new take on the connection 
between ontology, laws of nature and properties in physics and metaphysics.   
This view has been inspired by the primitive ontology (PO) approach but I do not think 
is necessitated by it or needs it, so you could endorse it even if you do not endorse the 
PO approach.  
Outline: a summary of the PO approach; a new (maybe crazy) take on how many properties and 
laws of nature there are. 
 
Primitive Ontology 
Basic assumption: scientific realism about fundamental physical theories– physics tells 
us about reality. But how does it do that?  
A physical theory is constituted by a bunch of mathematical variables. But physics is 
not mathematics: in order for a physical theory to represent the material world we need 
to give each mathematical object a particular significance. Depending of what 
significance we give them, we have actually a different picture of reality (under-
determination of physics by mathematics).  
According to the PO approach there are some mathematical objects that are somewhat 
privileged: the natural mathematical objects we should take as representing matter are 
those that live in R3 or R4. These objects are the PO of the theory (strictly speaking, the 
PO is the mathematical object but to simplify things, when it will not cause confusion 
we will also call PO the material object referring to it).  
PO = X in R3 or R4 ( X here denotes a generic variable, not necessarily the position of 
something, unless it happens the PO is the one of particles). 
Examples:  
 Classical Mechanics: the world is made of particles ‘living’ in a 3-d world, 
mathematically represented by points in R3. That is: PO= X (=particle’s position) 
in R3;   
 Quantum Mechanics: the answer depends on which quantum theory we 
consider.  
o Bohmian Mechanics (BM): the world is made of particles ‘living’ in a 3-d 
world, mathematically represented by points in R3. That is, PO=X 
(=particle’s position) in R3; 
o GRW theory: again, we distinguish between different types of GRW-like 
theories (see later for what ‘GRW-like theory’ means): 
 GRWm: PO= X=mass density function m of points in R3 that has 
values in R3: m: R3  R3  
 GRWf: PO=X (=events) in R4; 
 GRWp: PO= X (=particle’s position) in R3 ….  
o Many-Worlds (MW): again, we distinguish between different types of 
MW-like theories:  
 Sm: PO= X=mass density function m of points in R3 that has values 
in R3: m: R3  R3  
 Sf: … 
 …  
 
Law of Motion for the Primitive Ontology 
But to specify what exists in the physical world is not all that physics does: it also 
specifies how it is moves in space through time. This is done by the laws of motion, 
which specify the (temporal) trajectory of the PO in its natural arena (natural=to be 
explained later).  
Therefore, the other mathematical variables appearing into the theory are necessary to 
implement the law with which the PO moves. 
Trajectory of the PO:    Y(t)=f(X,t) 
The function f is the one that specifies the law of motion for the PO.  It has to be in such 
a way that the experimental predictions of the theory will match the actual 
experimental results (that is, such that the theory is experimentally adequate).  
Examples:  
 Classical Mechanics: PO= X in R3;  f (=law of motion for the PO): deterministic 
evolution ( X double dot=F/m, Newton’s 2nd law, where F=force, m=mass)  
 Quantum Mechanics: the answer depends on which quantum theory we 
consider: 
o Bohmian Mechanics:  
 PO=X in R3;  
 f (evolution of the PO) = deterministic evolution (for particle k with 
configuration Xk , Xk dot = (hbar/mk)[Im(](X1,…,XN) ) ;  
 g (evolution of )= deterministic (Schrodinger) evolution;  
o GRW theory: again, we distinguish between different types of GRW-like 
theories:  
 GRWm:  
 PO = mass density function m of points in R3 that has values 
in R3: m: R3  R3 
 f = indeterministic evolution (complicated to write down);  
 g = stochastic (modified Schrodinger evolution with 
collapse); 
 GRWf:  
 PO=X (=events) in R4;   
 f = indeterministic evolution (complicated to write down);  
 g = modified Schrodinger evolution with collapse; 
 GRWp:  
 PO= X (=particle’s position) in R3 ,  
 f = indeterministic evolution (complicated to write down);  
 g = modified Schrodinger evolution with collapse; 
o Many-Worlds (MW): again, we distinguish between different types of 
MW-like theories:  
 Sm: PO= X=mass density function m of points in R3 that has values 




The Flexible Wave Function and Physical Equivalence 
As we just saw, in the case of quantum theories in addition to the PO we have the wave 
function . In the PO approach, the wave function does not represent matter (because it 
does not live in R3 but is a function from R3N to complex numbers, where 3N is the 
number of degrees of freedom in the theory) but it is involved in the formulation of the 
law of motion for the PO. Depending on the theory, the wave function evolves 
according to the function g, which is specified by a particular equation.   
Three ingredients: X, the PO,  and f, its law of motion in terms of  (in quantum 
theories), which in turns evolve according to the function g. The trajectory of the PO 
will depend on the evolution of the wave function, that is Y=f(X) or Y=fg(X).   
We want a theory to be experimentally adequate, i.e., that the experimental predictions 
match the actual experimental results. This can be accomplished with different POs and 
different laws of motions as long as Y, the trajectory of the PO, remains the same: the 
experimental predictions are (macroscopic) results that depend on the (microscopic) 
trajectories of the PO. Once the trajectories are determined, so are the experimental 
predictions (different kinds of supervenience?). So, in principle, we could change 
whatever we want in a theory as long as Y remains the same: we could use a different 
PO, or f (either modifying the form of f or the wave function evolution g) or both, as 
long as Y remains the same. This could give rise to unnecessary convoluted and 
complicated theories, which are in principle possible, though. For instance, one could 
have a particle PO theory completely empirically equivalent to BM in which the wave 
function instead of evolving according to the deterministic Schrodinger equation, 
evolves according to a stochastic evolution (such that Y remains the same – see common 
structure paper).  Or we can have a flash theory completely empirically equivalent to 
GRWf in which the wave function instead of evolving according to the stochastic GRW 
equation, evolves according to a deterministic evolution (such that Y remains the same 
– see common structure paper).  
Is stochastic BM the same theory as deterministic BM? Is deterministic GRW the same 
theory as stochastic GRWf? They differ in the evolution of the wave function but not 
with respect of the evolution of the trajectories of the PO, so they are physically 
equivalent. The qualification ‘stochastic; and ‘deterministic’ here refer to the evolution 
of the wave function, not the PO, and since it is what matters here, they are, for all 
purposes here, not relevant.  
Do we have the same theory if the PO changes? No, because in this way we have 
changed the metaphysics. Do we have the same theory if f changes but Y remains the 
same? The theories are physically equivalent and one should probably pick, among the 
infinitely many possible physically equivalent theories, based on super-empirical 
criteria like simplicity. 
 
The theories listed above under GRW-type theories have in common only that the 
evolution of the wave function is stochastic and of the GRW-type. But this evolution is 
not important under this approach, and can be substituted by other kinds of evolution 
that preserve the trajectories of the PO remaining with the same theory. So, what do 
these theories have really in common? [Talk about Equivariance?]  
 
The nomenclature GRWm, GRWf and GRWp as well as the one Sm, Sf, and Sp, relies on 
the convention that the capital letters in front denote the kind of evolution the wave 
function has (respectively GRW evolution and Schrodinger one), while the lower case 
letters at the end identify the PO of the theory (respectively, mass density, flashes and 
particles). With this notation, one should call BM Sp: particle PO evolving according to 
a law of motion implemented via a Schrodinger evolving wave function.  
This notation, I think, is misleading since it focuses on the evolution of the wave 
function, which we saw is not fundamental in this approach. What is crucial is the 
evolution of the PO, which, somewhat ironically, is not even mentioned in here:  
is the evolution of the PO deterministic or stochastic? What kind of law do we have? 
One could probably use the following, hopefully a little less confusing, notation:  
POwf evolution PO evolution 
Main font=PO; subscript= wave function evolution (stochastic or deterministic, and 
what kind), superscript=PO evolution (stochastic or deterministic, and what kind).  
 
  
Examples: (in this case X denotes positions of particles’) 
Old name       New name 
BM=Sp          Xdeterministic deterministic (Schrodinger)  
Sm        mdeterministic deterministic (Schrodinger) 
Sf           (X,t)stochasticdeterministic (Schrodinger) 
GRWm                  mstochasticstochastic (modified Schrodinger)  
GRWf                   (X,t)stochasticstochastic (modified Schrodinger)  
GRWp                  Xstochasticstochastic (modified Schrodinger)  
 
With this notation, we see that many other theories are possible. […] 
Note: all S-PO theories and all GRW-PO theories are empirically equivalent with each 
other within theory group but they are not outside of it (even if Sm and Sf have a many-
worlds character so it is difficult to understand what empirical equivalence amounts to 
here – see later?): no GRW-kind theory is equivalent to any S-kind theory.  
 
From Micro to Marco 
One big motivation for the PO approach: it provides the natural way in which the 
physical explanation of the behavior of matter goes.  That is, in this way the explanation 
that physics provides of how matter behaves around us is straightforward and does not 
change much depending of what physical theory we consider. 
Macro properties= F(microscopic PO). That is, we have (in principle) complete 
reductionism with respect of the PO 
Other motivation: symmetry: I terms of the PO, it is clear what it means for a theory to 
have a given symmetry. That is, S is a symmetry of the theory if, when transformed 
under S, histories of the PO are still histories of the PO.  
[One might disagree about the necessity of the PO (see David Albert wave function 
ontology approach) and approach quantum theories in other ways. In the wave 
function ontology approach, the world is made of wave function and strictly speaking, 
there are no particles, no 3-d mass density fields, no spatio-temporal events: everything 
supervenes on the wave function, in a way that needs specification.]  
 
Fundamental Properties  
According to David Lewis (and this seems to be the standard view in this regard), there 
are the fundamental entities that physics gives us, they have natural fundamental 
properties, and they evolve according to given laws of nature that are also given to us 
by physical theories.  
In the PO approach, the metaphysics (=what matter is made of) is given by the PO, 
which evolves in time according to a given temporal evolution.  
The PO approach, it seems to me, suggests that we need just the Po and the laws, while 
the fundamental properties, as they are usually intended may not be necessary.  
Let us talk about fundamental properties here. What are they in quantum mechanics? 
This will be tricky since we have many quantum theories and we all even disagree 
about which the fundamental ontology should be. So let us start from the ‘easy’ (less 
controversial) case of classical mechanics.  
Classical Mechanics:  
Standard view: Ontology= particles; fundamental properties= position, mass; law of 
nature: Newton’s second law F=ma (forget about charge: that would involves 
electromagnetic fields and it would be necessary to say whether they belong to the 
ontology or not and this would complicate the discussion further).  
PO approach: just position is a fundamental property, not mass: it appears into the law 
of motion for the PO just like a parameter.  
The situation in QM is more messed up since it is unclear what we are talking about 
when we talk about QM, but the common view seems to be that mass is still a 
fundamental property of the ontology (whatever it is). Is that true?  
We need to distinguish again which quantum theory we are considering. Let us first see 
the PO approach and then move on to the wave function approach and let us see what 
fundamental properties we have on the table.  
Quantum Mechanics 
Standard view:  
– Ontology=  (whatever we choose) 
– fundamental properties=see above, mass (charge…) 
– law of nature: depend on the theory and the choice of the ontology 
PO approach: The only fundamental property we have is the one that defines the PO:  
– If PO=particles  fundamental property=positions 
– If PO= fields  fundamental property=field value (mass field, charge 
field…) 
So, in the PO approach, there are no fundamental properties other than the ones that are 
necessary to specify the PO (position if a particle PO, mass value if a mass density field 
PO, and so on). 
 
Laws of Nature 
Thought provoking and extreme view that seems to be inspired by the PO approach, 
but in no major way requires it (that is, also someone that does not buy it can have this 
view). 
Standard view: Ontology, fundamental properties, laws of nature.  
Example: CM-Standard view: Ontology= particles; fundamental properties= position, 
mass; law of nature: Newton’s second law F=ma.  
Different particles are identified by different masses, and they all follow the same law of 
motion (Newton’s second law).  
What if we completely change perspective and say that there is only one kind of entity 
with no other properties aside what is necessary to mathematically specify it and many 
laws?  
Standard view: Different entities (differentiated by fundamental properties), one law. 
Protons and electrons are different particles, identified by different masses that follow 
the same law of nature: F=ma, where for the electron m=me and for the proton m=mp. 
Ex: a proton is a point particle in which the point is, say, green colored; and electron is a 
point particle in which the point is, say, yellow colored.   
In the PO approach, the situation is exactly similar in the case of quantum theories with 
particles (and easily can be extended in the case of flashes). According to this view, 
there is only one kind of entity, in this case particles, identified by their positions, and 
many laws.  There are as many laws as there are fundamental particles in the standard 
view. 
Here protons and electrons are different particles not because they have different 
masses, because there are no masses as fundamental properties; they are different in the 
sense that they follow different laws of nature. That is, the electron follows law-e: 
F=mea, while the proton follows law-p: F=mpa. In this view a proton is a point which has 
no color which follows the, say, green trajectories; an electron is a point which has no 
color which follows the, say, yellow trajectories.  
The standard explanation in terms of fundamental properties is useful because it makes 
it easy to classify and identify different particles. For instance, in a theory with a particle 
ontology we could have electrons and protons which differ in terms of their mass 
(always forgetting about charge). If there are no fundamental properties other than 
position of particles, how do we differentiate between different kinds of particles? (In 
theories with a mass density field we have not this problem: there are two fundamental 
mass-density fields, one representing the electron and the other the proton. But a 
similar problem arises with theories of flashes.) If mass is a fundamental property we 
can say that they have a different mass, but in this case how do we distinguish them? 
Simple: there is a law for the proton and a law for the electron.  
 
 Consequences:  
1-There are no fundamental properties, aside from the ones required to specify the PO; 
2-There are as many laws as in the standard view there are fundamental entities. 
 
Advantages 
1-Spin is not a property:  spin as a property is at best a contextual property, namely it 
depends on the experiment is made (and this is not a very happy state of affair).  
If we follow this approach, spin is not a property at all; it is just part of the law of nature 
that governs the motion of the fundamental object in the theory.  
 
2-Ockham’s Razor: People have trouble defining what properties are; here we do not 
have that problem.  Since we have no fundamental properties, we do not have the 
problem of explaining what properties are!  It is a never-ending metaphysical topic to 
discuss what properties are (….) and no agreement whatsoever about it. In the standard 
view we have three categories: ontology, fundamental properties of the ontology and 
laws of nature. Here we have only two: ontology and laws of nature. Since we have 
fewer categories to account for, Ockham’s razor seems to favor the latter approach.  
 
3-Natural: after all, to distinguish a proton from an electron we look at its track in the 
bubble chamber and we see it curve one way rather than another, we measure its 
trajectory, not its mass or charge. The only thing one sees is stuff that moves….  
 
4- Massless particles: this view accounts for why the photon has no mass, accounts for 
the puzzle of the neutrino which does not seem to have any property… 
 
5- Relativity: it seems to be compatible with the fact that in relativity theory the mass 
changes with velocity. If mass is not a property, then we have no puzzle. One could say 
that the rest mass is the property, but then she is left to account to explain what the 
other mass is.  
 
Possible Objections 
1-This approach is unnecessarily radical: why do you want to get rid of properties if 
they function so well in the standard schema?  
Reply: 
a-It is not unnecessary: the standard approach does not function that well! People 
have no idea about what properties are […].  
b-It is not that radical: in fact, it seems that also the competitive approach in the 
possible metaphysics of QM, the wave function ontology, suggests the same 
attitude. If everything is ‘made of’ wave function, what is its fundamental property? 
Its field value, which is not the value of the mass of the particles or its positions, as 
usually intended.  […] 
 
2-There are way too many laws! One law for each massive object??? 
Reply: there is a law for each fundamental particle. The macroscopic objects are made 
by the microscopic entities in the PO and their behavior can be explained and accounted 
for in terms of them. Once we discuss the situation at the micro level, there are as many 
laws as there are fundamental particles. In the standard view we have, say, N 
fundamental particles identified by their fundamental properties (masses, for instance) 
and one law of nature; here we have one kind of particles, and N laws.  
The advantage over the standard view is that we do not have to explain what mass is: 
we have fewer categories, even if more entities per category 
 
3-there are way too many forces: instead of the fundamental 4 forces, we have 4 forces 
for each particle. 
Reply: same as above – we have fewer categories, even if more entities per category. 
 
4-E=mc2: the energy of the particle associated to its mass. How does that fit?  
Reply: energy is not a property either 
6-what about the Higgs boson? Isn’t that supposed to give mass to particles?  
Reply: QFT is a mess, detecting particles in high energy physics is extremely complex 
and indirect…. Who knows what they actually saw….  
 
 
 
 
 
 
